Naskh (tafsir)
Naskh (ルリウリョ) is an Arabic language word usually translated as "abrogation"; it shares the same root as the words appearing in the phrase al-nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh (リァルルリァリウリョ ル畏ァルルルリウル畏ョ, "the abrogating and abrogated [verses]"). It is a term used in Islamic legal exegesis for seemingly contradictory material within or between the twin bases of Islamic holy law: the Qur'ト] and the Prophetic Sunna. Over the last century, there have come to be serious objections to the very idea of Naskh within the Muslim community; returning to a dissenting attitude from early Muslim history (e.g., Abu Muslim Al-Asfahani 948-1038 C.E), many modern scholars now reject it outright.[citation needed] In its historical application, naskh typically involves the replacement (tabdトォl) of an earlier verse/tradition (and thus its embodied ruling) with a chronologically successive one. The complete suppression (izト〕a) of a regulation so that not even its wording remains is recognized as well, though only in the case of the Qur'ト].
The emergence of naskh (initially as practice and then as fully elaborated theory) dates back to the first centuries of Islamic civilization. Almost all classical naskh works, for instance, begin by recounting the incident of the Kufan preacher banned from expounding the Qur'ト] by an early 'ilmic authority figure (usually 'Alトォ but sometimes also Ibn 'Abbト《) on account of his ignorance of the principles of naskh.[1][2] Whatever the dubious historicity of such traditions:
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...the elaboration of the theories is datable with certainty to at least the latter half of the second century after Muhammad, when Shト’i'トォ, in his Risト〕a and in the somewhat later Ikhtilト’ al-Hadトォth was applying his considerable talents to resolving the serious problem of the apparent discrepancies between certain Qur'ト]ic verses and others; between certain hadトォths and others; and, most serious of all, between certain Qur'ト]ic verses and certain hadトォths.[3] |
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More precisely:
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Naskh as a technical term meaning 'abrogation' (although the precise sense of that must be left open) makes its appearance early on in exegesis, for example, in Muqト》il's [d. 767] Khams mi'a ト【a (and, of course, his tafsトォr).[4] |
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In time, more complex philological, theological, and philosophical theorizing accrued to this doctrine[5], and in general the amount of material recognized as either nト《ikh (abrogating) or mansナォkh (abrogated) has over time decreased as a result, from the 200+ verses cited by the high-medieval jurists to the 20 recognized by the late medieval al-Suyナォti and the mere adduced 7 in one modern study.[6][7]
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Theory
Naskh employs the logic of chronology and progressive revelation. The different situations encountered over the course of Muhammad's more than two decade term as prophet, it is argued, required new rulings to meet the Muslim community's changing circumstances. Or, from a more theologically-inflected stand-point, the expiration points of those rulings God intended as temporary all along were reached. A classic example of this is the early community's increasingly belligerent posture towards its pagan and Jewish neighbors:
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Many verses counsel patience in the face of the mockery of the unbelievers, while other verses incite to warfare against the unbelievers. The former are linked to the [chronologically anterior] Meccan phase of the mission when the Muslims were too few and weak to do other than endure insult; the latter are linked to Medina where the Prophet had acquired the numbers and the strength to hit back at his enemies. The discrepancy between the two sets of verses indicates that different situations call for different regulations.[8] |
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Yet despite its dependence on chronology, naskh is in no way a historiographical enterprise:
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While it cannot really be doubted that there is an implicit assumption of the chronological-progressive order of the Qur'ト] in the naskh texts, it is notable that the discussions themselves do not generally make this point explicit; naskh, be it with regards to wine or direction of prayer, always assumes that the present law is known (that is, no wine and facing Mecca), and the verses which agree with that fact are necessarily the valid ones. Any verses which contradict this are necessarily invalid, and thus can be logically arranged according to a basic notion of 'progressive revelation.' The arguments found in the naskh texts are, in short, based on logic not chronology.[9] |
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Naskh applies to only the regulative parts of God's revelation. In Tabarトォ's words:
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God alters what was once declared lawful into unlawful, or vice-versa; what was legally unregulated into prohibited and vice-versa. But such changes can occur only in verses conveying commands, positive and negative. Verses cast in the indicative and conveying narrative statements, can be affected by neither nト《ikh [abrogating material] nor mansナォkh [abrogated material].[10] |
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In particular, the central tenets of the faith are excluded from this process.
Between sources
Abrogation is applicable to both sources of Islamic law: the Qur'ト] and the Prophetic Sunna. A Qur'ト]ic verse may abrogate another Qur'ト]ic verse, and a Prophetic Sunna may likewise abrogate another Prophetic Sunna. The possibility of abrogation between these two sources, though, was a more contentious issue precipitated by the absence within a source of the appropriate abrogating (nト《ikh) or abrogated (mansナォkh) material necessary to bring concordance between it and the Fiqh.[11]
In Shト’i'トォ's source theory the possibility of abrogation between the Sunna and the Qur'ト] was vehemently denied:
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Arguing determinedly that any verbal discrepancies between the Qur'ト] and the reported sayings or reports of the practices of Muhammed- the Sunna of the Prophet- were merely illusory and could always be removed on the basis of a satisfactory understanding of the mechanism of revelation and the function of the prophet-figure, Shト’i'トォ set his face decidedly against any acceptance of the idea then current that in all such cases the Qur'ト] had abrogated the Sunna, or the Sunna the Qur'ト].[12][13] |
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This stance was a reaction to larger developments within Islamic jurisprudence, particularly the reformulation of the Fiqh away from early foreign or regional influences[14] and toward more eminently Islamic bases such as the Qur'ト]. This assertion of Qur'ト]ic primacy was accompanied by calls for an abandonment of the Sunna. Shト’i'トォ's insistence upon the impossibility of contradiction between Sunna and Qur'ト] can thus be seen as one component in this larger effort of rescuing the Sunna:
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He campaigned tirelessly to justify use of the Sunna as the second primary source alongside the Kur'ト] against those who would accord the hadトォth no role in the derivation of the sharトォ'a on the argument that the degree of conflict in the hadトォth, the inadequacies of the guarantee against corruption, fraud or error afforded by the isnト‥s rendered the hadトォth unfit for the sacred role of declaring the divine intent underlying the Kur'ト]'s declarations.[15] Asked point-blank whether the Sunna could ever be abrogated by the Qur'ト], Shト’i'トォ had bluntly replied [in the Risト〕a] that that could never happen. Were the Sunna to be abrogated by the Qur'ト], the Prophet would immediately introduce a second sunna to indicate that his first sunna had been abrogated by his second sunna- in order to demonstrate that a thing can be abrogated only by its like (mithlihi) [ cf. Q.2:106].[16] |
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Later scholars, writing when the juridicial legitimacy of the Sunna could be taken for granted (thanks largely to Shト’i'トォ's efforts!), were less inclined to adopt his inflexible stance. To their minds the reality of this sort of inter-source abrogation was proven by several "indisputable" instances: the changing of the qibla towards Mecca and away from Jerusalem, and the introduction of the penalty of stoning for adultery. The following passage from Qurtubトォ (al-Jト[i' li ahkト[ al-Qur'ト]) is representative in this regard:
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...the Qur'ト] may be naskhed by the Qur'ト] and the Sunna by the Sunna. The Qur'ト] may, in addition, be naskhed by the Sunna, as has occurred in the case of Q.2:180, which was replaced by the Sunna ruling: no wasiya [i.e. extra bequest] in favor of an heir. Mト〕ik admitted this principle, but Shト’i'トォ denied it, although the fuqahト all admit, in the instance of the penalty for adultery, that the flogging element of Q.24:2 has been allowed to lapse in the case of those offenders who are condemned to death by stoning. There is no explanation for the abandonment of the flogging element other than that the penalty all now acknowledge is based on the Sunna, i.e. the practice of the Prophet. In the instance of the change of qibla, a Sunna ruling was set aside in favor of a Qur'ト] ruling- there is no reference in the Qur'ト] to the Jerusalem direction of prayer.[16] |
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Al-Ghazト〕トォ employs the same three examples in his Mustasfト.[16]
One outcome of these disputations was the proposal of a mode of naskh known as naskh al-tilト『a dナォna al-hukm ("abrogation of the wording but not ruling") in order to provide a Qur'ト]ic nト《ikh, or abrogator, for Q.24:2 (see below).
Modes
Three modes of naskh were proposed by the classical exegetes:
- naskh al-hukm dナォna al-tilト『a: abrogation of the ruling but not the wording, or supersession. A regulation- embodied within either a Qur'ト]ic verse or a hadith report- is replaced but its wording remains- in the former case, as text within the mushaf.
- naskh al-hukm wa-'l-tilト『a: abrogation of both ruling and wording, or suppression/erasure. Applicable only to the Qur'ト]. A ruling is voided and its text omitted from the mushaf. Evidence that the verse ever existed is preserved only within tradition.
- naskh al-tilト『a dナォna al-hukm: abrogation of the wording but not the ruling. Again, applicable only to the Qur'ト]. The text of a still-functional ruling is omitted from the mushaf. Proof of the verse's existence is preserved within tradition (i.e through a hadith report) as well as in the Fiqh.
Of these three modes of naskh, it was the first - naskh al-hukm dナォna al-tilト『a - which received widespread recognition.[12] The second mode, naskh al-hukmwa-'l-tilト『a, was also generally acknowledged, in part due to the many alleged instances of revelatory erasure:
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Of special importance were allegations of actual omissions from the revelation such as those recording the "loss" of a verse in praise of the Bi'r Ma'ナォna martyrs, the Ibn トdam "verse" and reports on the alleged originally longer versions of sナォras IX or XXXIII, said to have once been as long as sナォra II and to have been the locus of the stoning "verse" [ ト【at al-rajm ]. Lists were compiled of revelations verifiably received by Muhammad and publicly recited during his lifetime until subsequently withdrawn (raf'), with the result that when the divine revelations were finally brought together into book-form, there was collected into the mushaf only what could still be recovered following the death of the Prophet. The mushaf has from the outset been incomplete relative to the revelation, but complete in that we have all that God intended us to have.[17] |
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In all, 564 verses were alleged to have been expunged from the mushaf, or 1/11th of its total content.[7][18]
The third mode, naskh al-tilト『a dナォna al-hukm, was accepted by only a minority of scholars.[19] The most prominent alleged instance of this sort of abrogation is the naskh of the so-called ト【at al-rajm, or stoning verse. Adduced to exist from a tradition derived from the caliph 'Umar, the verse provided Qur'ト]ic sanction for the penalty for adultery found within the Fiqh (i.e. stoning) in contravention to the penalty prescribed by Q.24:2 - flogging.
The postulation of this mode stems (indirectly, however) from Shト’i'トォ's source theory which rejected abrogation between sources:
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However strictly Shト’i'トォ had approached the question of the feasibility or otherwise of the naskh of the Qur'ト] by the Sunna, the fact cannot be disguised that he had admitted the stoning penalty for adultery into his Fiqh. It is nowhere mentioned in the Qur'ト] (Q.24:2) and has no other source than the Sunna. As Schacht observed, on this point, Shト’i'トォ's theoretical structure collapses. Shト’i'トォ's failure to explain the presence of stoning in the Fiqh which he had inherited exposed his usナォl theory to the criticism of follower and opponent alike, leading to its partial abandonment. Ironically, the attempt to ameliorate the usナォl position by reconciling the explanation of stoning to the obvious- that the stoning penalty had derived from a stoning-'verse'- led, in turn, to the adoption by followers of non-Shト’i'トォ usナォl of the rationalizing tag, naskh al-tilト『a dナォna al-hukm. They needed no such principle, since they sanguinely accepted the feasibility of the naskh of the Qur'ト] by the Sunna.[20] |
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Though Shト’i'トォ thus never in fact postulated the existence of a "stoning verse", in one particular instance he did acknowledge the probability of "abrogation of wording but not ruling":
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Shト’i'トォ shows no interest in the type of theoretical question leading to the postulation of the existence of a hypothetical "proto-Qur'ト]" to account for the presence at one time in the Qur'ト] of verses no longer surviving. He was none the less forced on one question- the much debated definition of the minimum number of sucklings [from a common wet nurse] required to set up a bar to marriage [due to "consanguinity", or 'adad al-radト al-muharrim; cf. Q.4:23]- to posit the revelation to Muhammed of a verse on this topic, which, however, was not to be found in the Qur'ト] texts of his day.[21] His normal assiduity to ascertain the Prophet's views on disputed legal matters led him to accept a hadトォth which, however, comes not from the Prophet, but from his widow. 'ト'isha declared that God had revealed a Kur'ト] verse stating that the minimum number was ten; subsequently a second verse was revealed, declaring that the minimum was five and that this second verse was still being publicly recited when the Prophet died. Mト〕ik had drily rejected this report as not being in conformity with the "practice". Al-Shト’i'トォ embraced it and made it the basis of his Fikh.[17] |
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Implicit in the latter two modes of naskh is the distinction between the Qur'ト] as temporally contingent document-i.e. the mushaf- and the Qur'ト] as the unity of all revelation ever sent down to Muhammed. According to some exegetes this latter conception is not a wholly abstract one, but in fact corresponds to a heavenly reality, with the Qur'ト] existing as a celestial archetype within the Mother of the Book (umm al-kitト|) (Q.43:4) or upon the Preserved Tablet (Q.85:21). Thus those verses omitted from the terrestrial mushaf may yet be said to still endure in Heaven.[22]
External naskh
A fourth mode of naskh, deemed "external," is that between dispensations. In Islamic prophetology, a messenger may abrogate certain ritual and social laws handed down by his predecessors in order to lighten Man's burden, make lawful what had previously been unlawful, and therefore demonstrate God's mercy for His creation.[23] According to Burton, "that Muhammad accepted a doctrine of external naskh cannot be doubted", and indeed naskh's Qur'ト]ic "proof text", Q.2:106, coming as it does right after a series of verses abrogating many aspects of the Jewish Halakha, may intend this sort of naskh.[24]
In the Canon
The stem n-s-kh occurs four times within the Qur'ト]: at Q.7:154, Q.45:29, Q.22:52, and Q.2:106. The first two occurrences come in the context of texts and scribal activity: "in the writing [nuskhah] thereon" (Q.7:154) and "For We were wont to put on Record [nastansikh] all that ye did" (Q.45:29). These uses, combined with the secular Arabic usage nasakha al-kitト|- "he copied the book"- led some to equate naskh with transfer (nql)- as in the transfer of an activity from one legal category (e.g. allowed) to another (forbidden). Overall, though, these verses were of marginal importance for the exegesis of naskh.
More significant is the occurrence at Q.22:52:
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Never did We send an apostle or a prophet before thee, but, when he framed a desire, Satan threw some (vanity) into his desire: but God will cancel [yansakh] anything (vain) that Satan throws in, and Allah will confirm (and establish) His Signs: for Allah is full of Knowledge and Wisdom |
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This verse, cited by Tabarトォ in connection with the incident of the so-called "Satanic Verses", supported an interpretation of naskh as eradication (izト〕a) and thus made acceptable the idea of naskh as the nullification of a verse without any replacement- naskh al-hukm wa-'l-tilト『a. In Tabarトォ's interpretation (Tafsトォr):
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The ト【as concerning which God here announces that He will endorse them are without any doubt, the ト【as of his revealed Book. It is thus clear that what the devil had cast into that revealed Book is precisely what God announces that He has removed from it and suppressed. God then endorsed His book by removing that utterance from it.[25] |
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The "hint of dualism" in this passage (even Satan, Tabarトォ seems to say, plays a meaningful role in the dialectical process of God's revelation) is more apparent than real. In order to enlist Q.22:52 as incontrovertible proof of naskh's eradicatory facility, Tabarトォ must gloss over the essential difference between the activity pledged within it and those forms of abrogation considered the legitimate expressions of naskh- namely, the authentically divine provenance of the latters' abrogated material. Thus his incentive to construe the divine eradication of Satanic material as a purposeful, even constructive, activity, rather than a wholly reactive and defensive one. Later exegetes such as Makkトォ would carefully guard this distinction, though:
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Q.22:52 does not "indicate" the intellectual acceptability of naskh. It merely shows that God eradicates what the Devil insinuates into the Prophet's recital. It does not indicate the occurrence in the divine revelations of the naskh of what God considers to be part of his truth.[26] |
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Thus Q.22:52 was relegated to merely lexical significance.
It was Q.2:106 which served as the chief Qur'ト]ic "proof-text" for naskh, and indeed it lent the concept its very name[27]:
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None of Our revelations do We abrogate [nansakh] or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar: Knowest thou not that Allah Hath power over all things? |
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Opinion as to naskh's technical meaning here oscillated between replacement (ibdト〕) and nullification (ibtト〕). This despite the fact that the former meaning would make the coordinate clause's "We substitute something better or similar" tautological. To work around this problem exegetes such as Tabarトォ interpolated hukm (ruling) in place of the word ト【a, arguing that if a ruling is replaced the preservation or not of its wording in the mushaf is immaterial, thus letting the verse confirm the two main types of naskh.[28] Alternate interpretations were also suggested for the subordinate clause's "cause to be forgotten" (aw nansahト), such as defer or leave. This was primarily motivated by flight from the theologically-repugnant idea of prophetic forgetting[29], with Q.15:9 cited as evidence of its impossibility. Yet verses Q.17:86, Q.18:24, and Q.87:6-7 explicitly endorse its feasibility. Thus "Qur'ト]-forgetting is clearly adumbrated in the Qur'ト]".[30] Many ahadith also attest to the phenomenon: entire suras which the Muslims had previously recited, claims one, would one morning be discovered to have been completely erased from memory[31] (cf. Abナォ 'Ubaid al-Qト《im b. Sallト[). In the same spirit of "turning lemons into lemonade" which characterizes much else within the theologizing of naskh, divine purpose was attributed to such incidents; Rト】トォ, for example, speculates that they may have figured among the Prophet's miracles.
Finally, there exist two important linguistically-unrelated verses cited in connection with naskh: Q.16:101- "When We substitute [tabdトォl] one revelation for another"- and Q.13:39- "Allah doth blot out or confirm what He pleaseth". Besides confirming the two major modes of abrogation (i.e. suppression and supersession), the former verse is employed by Shト’i'トォ in his theory of abrogation between sources as proof that a Qur'ト] verse can only be abrogated by another Qur'ト] verse.
Historical Elaboration
Like other technical terms within Islamic exegesis (e.g. asbト| al-nuzナォl), naskh attained its formal meaning through a process of theoretical refinement in which early applications of the concept were abandoned upon further logical or religious consideration. Tabarトォ's ambivalent use of the term for the eradication of Satanic material has already been noted. Among naskh 's other, ultimately discarded, uses in early works of tafsトォr are: the abrogation of a ruling from pre-Islamic (i.e. jト”ilトォ) Arabia, and the juridicial deflation of a broadly applicable ruling by a succeeding one which narrows its scope (nasakha min [al-ト【a]- "an exception is provided to [the verse]").[22] The latter usage was reformulated by Shト’i'トォ as takhsトォs (specification/exception), resulting in a marked decrease in the amount of material considered mansナォkh.
Putting aside dubiously attributed works, such as the Naskh al-Qur-ト] of "al-Zuhrトォ"[32], the principle of abrogation (without its naskh terminology) makes one of its earliest documented appearance in the Muwatta' of Mト〕ik:
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In his review of the question of whether the Muslim traveler should observe or may postpone the obligation to fast during the month of Ramadト], which involves him in a comparison of conflicting opinion reported from many prominent Muslims of the past, including contradictory reports as to the practice of the Prophet himself, Mト〕ik states that his teacher Zuhrトォ had told him that the Muslims had adopted as standard the latest of all the Prophet's reported actions... while in another chapter Mト〕ik himself actually states that of the two relevant Kur'ト] rulings, one had replaced the other. Elsewhere, Mト〕ik rejects the notion that a ruling remains valid despite the reported withdrawal of the wording of the supposed Kur'ト] 'verse' said to have originally imposed the ruling in question."[33] |
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The impetus for this principle, seen already in Mト〕ik's day, was the need to harmonize the regional variants of Islamic law both with one another as well as the putative sources of Islamic law. That the starting point for these local fiqhs was in fact neither the Qur'ト] nor the Sunna (in its later sense of the Sunna of Muhammad) has been shown by Schacht. As authority for local views began to be attributed back in time to the Companions and eventually Muhammad himself (documented by what Schacht terms the "backward growth" of isnト‥s) the contradictions in regional fiqh became irreconcilable.[34] Naskh allowed for the alleviation of these tensions by the claim that, in the case of two "soundly" documented traditions contradicting one another, one had come later and abrogated the other.
Yet even after the need to ground their legal theories in either Sunna or Qur'ト] became apparent to the jurists, the regional fiqhs were not discarded, but became the third source in reformualting Islamic law[35], on par with and of even greater importance than Sunna or Qur'ト]![36] This can be seen in the postulation of "lost" verses whose rulings were still operative and conventiently corroborative of the jurist's own school of fiqh (e.g. the "stoning" and "suckling" verses). It is also evinced in Shト’i'トォ's remarkable admission that but for the guidance of the Sunna the Muslims would have had no choice but to carry out the rulings of the Qur'ト]![37]
In non-Sunni Islam
The principle of naskh is acknowledged by both Sunnis and Shトォ'a[12], completely outside of the latter's allegations (which in any case would not conform to the principle of naskh proper) that material favorable to 'Alトォ was expunged from the 'Uthmト] mushaf.[38] Among those groups that did reject naskh were the Mu'tazili and Zaidiyah, on the rationalist grounds that the word of God could not contain contradictions, and the much later Ahmadトォs, who argued that all Qur'ト]ic verses have equal validity, in keeping with their emphasis on the "unsurpassable beauty and unquestionable validity of the Qur'ト]".[39] The harmonization of apparently incompatible rulings is resolved through their juridical deflation in Ahmadトォ fiqh, so that a ruling (considered to have applicability only to the specific situation for which it was revealed), is effective not because it was revealed last, but because it is most suited to the situation at hand.[40] In this way Ahmadトォs were able to contend that Q.9:5 (the sword verse) had not abrogated all verses calling for peaceful co-existence with the non-Muslims.
Theology
Naskh stimulated several lines of theologizing to reconcile this "reality of the Fiqh" with Islam's core religious doctrines.
Probably the most immediate concern was explaining the very existence of progressive revelation. What could account for God's turn to this expedient outside of limits to His omniscience (subsequent rulings are "better" because they are informed by superior knowledge) or inconstancy in the divine will? Both prospects were repugnant to orthodox theologians (at least of the Sunni variety; compare this to the Shi'ite doctrine of bada', however) and so other rationales were put forth. One of these relied upon the tried apologetic technique (see the argument for theodicy from free will, for example) of reconstruing apparent limitations in the Creator as expressions of solicitude towards His creatures, and indeed as tokens of His mercy towards them. This was formalized in the doctrine of tahkfトォf and is frequently expressed by commentators such as Tabarトォ, who argued in his exegesis of Q.2:106 that one motivation for naskh was God's desire to lighten the ritualistic and legal burdens He had imposed upon mankind:
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The ruling may be better for you in this life, on account of its being easier to perform, where a previous obligation has been withdrawn, relieving you of the more difficult performance. For example, it has once been obligatory for the Muslims to engage in lengthy nocturnal prayers (Q.73:1). They were relieved of that burden (Q.73:20). That is an instance in which the nト《ikh [abrogating (verse)] was better for them in this life.[41] |
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Yet tahkfトォf is equally applicable where the nト《ikh introduces a more onerous requirement- for example, the extension of the ritual fast from a few days (Q.2:184) to the entire month of Ramadan (Q.2:185)- as its performance is "better" for men on account of it helping them attain greater reward in the Hereafter, or even when the change is indifferent, such as the switching of the qibla, as the reward will not change.[42] Clearly, then, the criteria of tahkfトォf is unfalsifiable, completely useless for distinguishing nト《ikh from mansナォkh, and therefore entirely dogmatic in character.
Another, much more specifically Islamic, problem was raised by the doctrine by mu'jaz- or the literary perfection and inimitability of the Qur'ト]. How could one ト【a be replaced by one which is better than it, as Q.2:106 explicitly promises, if all ト【at or inimitable and therefore incommensurable? This issue was side-stepped by interpolation; the superior replacement is the verse's ruling, not the verse's wording, and so no violation of the doctrine of mu'jaz is entailed.
Lastly, there is the issue of abrogated material whose wording is preserved in the mushaf (naskh al-hukm dナォna al-tilト『a). Since the verse's ruling is inoperative, what purpose is served by retaining its wording? One common rationale, expressed here by Suyナォti (Itqト]) and mirroring the tahkfトォf argument was:
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...the Qur'ト] was revealed so that its rulings might be known and their implementation rewarded; but... the Qur'ト] is also recited with reverence, since it is the word of God, for whose recitation the pious Muslim is likewise rewarded. Further, to leave the wording, following the abrogation of the ruling was to provide for men a constant reminder of the compassion and mercy shown by their gracious Lord [ar-Rahman] Who had lightened the burden of some his His previous requirements.[43] |
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Overall, though, the Muslim commentators demonstrate a remarkable degree of complacency in the face of naskh 's more theologically disturbing implications, supremely confident (as expressed in the following gloss on a famous ト'isha hadith) that whatever the mechanisms used to expurgate or cancel the Divine revelation, what has ultimately come down to us is exactly what Allah intended mankind to have:
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We were too occupied with the preparations in the Prophet's sick-room to give any thought to the safe-keeping of the sheets on which the revelations had been written out, and while we were tending our patient, a household animal got in from the yard and gobbled up some of the sheets which were kept below the bedding. Those who would account for all events here below in terms of divine agency could see in this most unfortunate mishap nothing incongruous with the divine promise, having revealed the Reminder, to preserve it. Here, indeed, was the working of the divine purpose... their removal, as an aspect of the divine revelatory procedures had been determined by God and had occurred under effective divine control. Having determined that these 'verses' would not appear in the final draft of His Book, God had arranged for their removal. The revelation was never, at any time, at the mercy of accidental forces.[44] |
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Such complacency reflects the important constitutive effects of naskh's eventual theological sanitization. Once the genuineness of God's abrogation of His own commandments was accepted, the fact that no intelligible pattern underlay His sequence of actions was taken as indicative of important facts about the nature of the Creator, as well as the proper duties of His creatures. In particular this reinforced the extreme deontological currents within Islamic philosophy and ethics:
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The Supreme Being imposes or forbids what He chooses. Nothing is either good or evil per se; God does not command 'the good' and prohibit 'the evil'. What God commands is good and what He forbids is evil. God is under no compulsion to any external moral imperative. Adherence to what He commands will be rewarded; performance of what he forbids will be punished. Both command and prohibition being tests of human obedience, God may naskh what He chooses. [45] The Creator and Sovereign Lord of the Universe shares His absolute power with none. To test man's obedience, God may order them to do whatever he chooses, or to desist from whatever He wills. He may command what was never previously required or forbid what was previously unregulated; equally. He may prohibit what He Himself had actually commanded, or command what He Himself had previously prohibited... Nor may men question anything that God requires of them. They must only identify what God has commanded or forbidden and act immediately to demonstrate their creaturely status and humble obedience. [46] |
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Literature
In addition to being discussed within general works of jurisprudence, naskh generated its own corpus of specialized legal manuals. These treatises invariably begin with an introduction designed to impress the importance and high Islamic credibility of the science, often by an appeal to 'ilmic authority figures of the past (as in the story of 'Alトォ and the Kufan preacher). As is made clear in these stories, "none may occupy judicial or religious office in the community who is not equipped with this indispensable knowledge and who is incapable of distinguishing nト《ikh [abrogator] from mansナォkh [abrogatee].[47]
The remainder of the introduction then typically treats the various modes of naskh, naskh 's applicability between Sunna and Qur'ト], and- in appeasement of theological scruples- why naskh is not the same as badト', or inconstancy of the Divine Will. Following this comes the core of the treatise, an enumeration of abrogated verses in sナォra order of the Qur'ト].[48] In their consideration of nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh the taxonomic predilections of these authors comes out, evinced in their discussions of special verses considered "marvels" ('ajト'ib) of the Qur'ト], such as the verse which abrogates the greatest number of other verses (Q.9:5), the verse which was in effect longest until it was abrogated (Q.46:9), and the verse which contains both an abrogatee and its abrogator (Q.5:105).[49]
Skepticism
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The skeptics point to the two verses which have been the bases for the concept of abrogation and put forward the arguments against abrogation by challenging the interpretation of the two verses. The argument by A. Muhammed in his book 'The lie of abrogation' is roughly reproduced below:
- "Whichever Ayah We nansakh (cause to be forgotten) We replace it with its equal or with that which is greater, did you not know that God is capable of all things?" 2:106
The focus is on the words "nansakh" and "Ayah", and the scholars against abrogation give examples of the use of the words elsewhere in the Quran to point out the weakness in the pro-abrogation arguments. The word Ayah, as used in the Quran, can have one of four different meanings:
a- It could mean a miracle from God as in:
"And We supported Moses with nine profound Ayahs (miracles)." 17:101
b- It could also mean an example for people to take heed from as in:
"And the folk of Noah, when they disbelieved the messengers, We have drowned them and set an Ayah (example) of them for all people."25:37
c- The word 'Ayah' can also mean a sign as in:
"He said, 'My Lord, give me an Ayah (sign).' He said, 'Your Ayah is that you will not speak to people for three consecutive nights." 19:10
d- It could mean a verse in the Quran, as in:
"This is a book that We have sent down to you that is sacred, perhaps they will reflect on its Ayat (verses)." 38:29
Similarly they point out that in verse 106 of Sura 2, the word 'Ayah' in this particular verse could not mean a verse of the Quran. It can mean any of the other meanings (miracle, example or sign) but not a verse in the Quran. This argument goes like this:
- - The words "cause to be forgotten" could not be applicable if the word 'Ayah' in this verse meant a verse in the Quran. How can a verse in the Quran become forgotten? For even if the verse was invalidated by another (as the interpreters falsely claim) it will still be part of the Quran and thus could never be forgotten.
- - The words "We replace it with its equal" would be meaningless if the word 'Ayah' in this verse meant a Quranic verse, simply because it would make no sense for God to invalidate one verse then replace it with one that is identical to it!
- - If the word 'Ayah' in verse 106 meant a miracle, an example or a sign, then all the words of the verse would make perfect sense. The words "cause to be forgotten" can apply to all three meanings and that is what actually happens with the passing of time. The miracles of Moses and Jesus have long been forgotten. We only believe in them because they are mentioned in the Quran.
Similarly the words "We replace with its equal or with that which is greater" is in line with the miracles of God. God indeed replaces one miracle with its equal or with one that is greater than it. Consider the following verse:
- "And We have sent Moses with Our Ayah's (miracles or signs) to Pharaoh and his elders proclaiming : 'I am a messenger from the Lord of the universe'. When he brought them our Ayah's they laughed at him. Every Ayah We showed them was greater than the one that preceded it." 43:46-48
The word nansakh which is used in 2:106 comes from the verb nasakha. It has been claimed that this word in 2:106 means abrogate. However, on closer inspection of all the Quranic verses which use this word, it can be found that this word means quite the opposite. It means to record or write down. When God wants to say "substitute" the Arabic word used is BADDALA; an example is found in 16:101
- "When We baddalna (substitute) one Ayat (revelation) in place of another, and God is fully aware of what He reveals, they say, 'You made this up'. Indeed most of them do not know" 16:101
The substitution spoken of here is concerned with one of two things:
a- The substitution of one Scripture in place of another. This first meaning is given evidence to in the following verse:
- "Then we revealed to you this scripture, truthfully, confirming previous scriptures, and superseding them." 5:48
Here, the words "superseding them." confirm that the previous scripture were substituted with the Quran.
b- The substitution of one law within one Scripture with another in a subsequent Scripture.
This second meaning is also given evidence to in the Quran where various issues that were prohibited to the previous people of the book were made lawful in the Quran.
The following is a list of classical examples of the genre:
- "al-Zuhrトォ", Naskh al-Qur-ト]
- Abナォ 'Ubaid al-Qト《im b. Sallト[ (d. 838), Kitト| al-nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh (Book of the Abrogating and Abrogated [Verses])
- al-Nahhト《 (d. 949), Kitト| al-nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh
- Hibat Allト” ibn Salト[a (d. 1019), Kitト| al-nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh
- al-Baghト‥トォ (d. 1037), al-Nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh
- Makkトォ b. Abナォ Tト〕ib al-Qaisトォ (d. 1045) al-トェdト” li-nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa-mansナォkhihi
- Ibn al-'Atト'iqトォ (d. 1308), al-Nト《ikh wal-mansナォkh
- Ibn Hkuzayma al-Fト〉isトォ, Kitト| al-mujト】 fトォ'l-nト《ikh wa'l-mansナォkh
- Ibn Al-Jawzトォ, Nawト《ikh al-Qur-ト]
- Jalト〕-ud-Dトォn al-Suyナォナ」i, Al-Itqト] fi Ulナォm al-Qur-ト]
Modern examples include:
- Ahmad Shah Waliullah Dehlvi, Al-Fawz al-Kabトォr fi Uナ淒ォl al-Tafsトォr
- Mustafト Zayd, Al-Naskh fil-Qur'ト] al-Kari-m, Cairo: Dト〉 al-Fikr al-'Arabトォ, 1963
- Ali Hasan Al-Arトォト, Fatトァ al-Mannト] fi naskh al-Qur-ト]
- Abd al-Mutaト〕 al-Jabri, Al-Nト《ikh wal-Mansナォkh bayn al-Ithbト》 wal-Nafy, Cairo: Wahba Bookstore, 1987
- Mustafa Ibrahトォm al-Zalmi, Al-Tibyト] liraf` Ghumナォト al-Naskh fi al-Qur-ト], Arbトォl: National Library, Iraq, 2000
- Ihト| Hasan Abduh, Istiトァト〕at Wujナォd al-Naskh fi al-Qurト], Cairo: Al-Nト’itha Bookstore, 2005
Instances
The amount of material recognized as abrogated by Muslim exegetes and jurists varied, partly as the result of the continuous refinement of the concept (e.g. Shト’i'トォ's introduction of the distinction between naskh and takhsトォs), partly as a result of the normally disputatious process of elaborating the law. Hibat Allト”, for example, lists 239 instances of abrogation across 71 suras, with Q.9:25 accounting for almost half of the mansナォkh verses. Many modern Muslim scholars have proposed more stringent criteria, arguing that only material which directly (and exactly) contradicts previous rulings can be said to be abrogating (nト《ikh).
Frequently cited examples of intra-Qur'ト]ic abrogation are:
- Verse: Q.8:65
- Abrogator (nト《ikh): The immediately succeeding Q.8:66, which lightens the ratio of enemies the Muslims are expected to vanquish from 10:1 to 2:1 .
- Verse: Q.2:180
- Verse: 2.219
- Abrogator: Q.4:43, whose more explicit disapproval of drunkenness is in turn abrogated by Q.5:90, which institutes a complete ban on the consumption of alcohol:
- Verse: Q.9:5 (ト【at al-sayf, the "sword verse")
- Abrogatee (mansナォkh): Literally dozens of verses enjoining the umma's peacable conduct towards outside groups: Hibat Allト” and al-Nahhト《 cite 124 and 130 verses, respectively[7]. Ibn al Jawzトォ and Mustafト Zayd count 140 verses[50] and Ibn Kathir says in his Tafsir that 9.5 abgrogated "It abrogated every agreement of peace between the Prophet and any idolator, every treaty, and every term."
- Verse: Q.9:29
- Abrogatee: "Nahhト《 considers 9:29 to have abrogated virtually all verses calling for patience or forgiveness toward Scriptuaries"[51].
Examples of inter-Qur'ト]ic abrogation, where one of the rulings comes from the Sunna, are:
- Verse: Q.24:2
- Abrogator: For those unwilling to countenance the existence of a "lost" ト【at al-rajm (e.g. Qurtubトォ, Al-Ghazト〕トォ), the Prophetic Sunna which establishes stoning to death as the penalty for adultery.
See also
Notes
- ^ Powers, The Exegetical Genre nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa mansナォkhuhu, ISBN 0-19-826546-8, p. 124
- ^ Rippin, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 47, ISSN 0041-977X, pp. 26, 38
- ^ Burton, Journal of Semitic Studies 15, ISSN 0022-4480, p. 250
- ^ Rippin, BSOAS 47, p. 41
- ^ Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation, ISBN 0-7486-0108-2, p. 5
- ^ Powers, The Exegetical Genre nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa mansナォkhuhu, pp. 122-123
- ^ a b c Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 184
- ^ Burton, Naskh, Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI)イ
- ^ Rippin, BSOAS 51, p. 18
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 458
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 37
- ^ a b c Burton, JSS 15, p. 250
- ^ Qadhi, An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur'aan; UK Al-Hidaayah Publishing and Distribution, 1999, p. 233
- ^ Schacht, Fikh, EIイ
- ^ Burton,Naskh, EIイ
- ^ a b c Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 466
- ^ a b Burton, Naskh, EIイ
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 50
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 452
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48 p. 467
- ^ Burton, JSS 15, p. 251
- ^ a b Rippin, BSOAS 47, p. 42
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 166-167, pp. 180-182
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 182, 205
- ^ Burton, JSS 15, p. 265
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 454 (note 6)
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 55, p. 205
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 89-90
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 55
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 457
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 45
- ^ Rippin, BSOAS 47
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. viii
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 13
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 30, 37
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 79
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 140
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 95
- ^ Friedmann, Jihト‥ in Ahmadトォ Thought, ISBN 965-264-014-X, p. 227
- ^ Friedmann, Jihト‥ in Ahmadトォ Thought, p. 227
- ^ Burton, BSOAS 48, p. 462
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 116
- ^ Burton, JSS 15, p. 252
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 33
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 101
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, p. 3
- ^ Burton, Islamic Theories of Abrogation, pp. 37-39
- ^ Powers, The Exegetical Genre nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa mansナォkhuhu, pp. 120-122
- ^ Powers, The Exegetical Genre nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa mansナォkhuhu, pp. 130-132
- ^ Reuven Firestone, Jihト‥: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, ISBN 0-19-515494-0, p. 151 (note 21)
- ^ Firestone, Jihト‥, p. 151
References
- "Naskh" (CD-ROM v. 1.0 ed.). 1999.
- John Burton (1970). "Those Are the High-Flying Cranes". Journal of Semitic Studies 15: 246-264. doi:10.1093/jss/15.2.246.
- John Burton (1985). "The Exegesis of Q.2:106 and the Islamic Theories of Naskh: Mト nansakh min ト【a aw nansahト[sic] na'ti bi khairin minhト aw mithlihト". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48: 452-469.
- John Burton (1990). The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 0-7486-0108-2.
- Andrew Rippin (1984). "Al-Zuhrトォ, Naskh al-Qur'ト] and the Problem of Early Tafsトォr Texts". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 47: 22-37.
- Andrew Rippin, editor (1988). Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur'ト]'. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-826546-8.
- David S. Powers. The Exegetical Genre nト《ikh al-Qur'ト] wa mansナォkhuhu. pp. 117-138.
- Andrew Rippin (1988). "The function of asbト| al-nuzナォl in Qur'ト]ic exegesis". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 51: 1-20.
- Moshe Sharon, ed. (1997). Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon. Brill Academic Publishers. ISBN 965-264-014-X.
- Yohanan Friedmann. Jihト‥ in Ahmadトォ Thought". pp. 221-236.
- John Wansbrough and Andrew Rippin, ed. (2004). Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-59102-201-0.
External links
Islamic
- "Abrogation?" Islamic scholar GF Haddad answers some questions
- "Naskh (Abrogation)", by Suheil Laher
- Load-Islam.com's Refutation on Peaceful verses being abrogated by Swordvers
- Submission.org's claim against the Qur'an-Abrogation
- TheMostReadBook.org forums Extensive and detailed discussion of the hypothesis of abrogation in the Quran in principle and of each claim made in the classic literature
- [1] Clarifications by Bismikaalahuma.org