Akhbari
The AkhbÄrÄ«s (Arabic: اخباري) "Traditionalists" are Twelver ShÄ«'a Muslims who reject the use of ijtihad or reasoning in the creation of new laws, and believe only the Qur'an and aḥadÄ«th (prophetic sayings and recorded opinions of the ImÄms) should be used as sources of law.[1] They form a minority within ShÄ«'a Islam, with UsÅ«lÄ«s making up the majority. Unlike UsÅ«lÄ«s, AkhbÄrÄ«s do not follow marja's who practice ijtihad. The AkhbÄrÄ« movement was dominant in Twelver Shi'i Islam from the middle of the Safavid dynasty to the time of Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (d.1792) who along with other Usuli mujtahids crushed the Akhbari movement.[2] Today it is found primarily in the island nation of Bahrain,[1] with reportedly "only a handful of Shi'i ulema" remaining Akhbari "to the present day."[3]
[] BackgroundIn addition to fatÄwa based on ijtihad, AkhbÄrÄ«s also reject the permissibility of writing exegesis of the Qur'an without quoting the narrations of the infallible Ahlu l-Bayt. They quote the Hadith ath-Thaqalayn and several authentic traditions of the Twelve ImÄms to prohibit the practice of exegesis. In short, the gist of AkhbÄrÄ« ideology is that nothing but the aḥadÄ«th of the Infallibles can serve as authoritative evidence in Islam. AkhbÄrÄ«s also differ from UsÅ«lÄ«s in their rejection of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, arguing that preachers of religion have no role in politics, as is evidenced by the lives of the ImÄms and their followers. UsÅ«lism evolved on the basis of hypothetical concepts and perceptions of some scholars, centuries after the major occultation. Among the earliest ShÄ«'a ulamÄ' such as Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni and Ibn Babawaiyya, the most important activity was transmission of aḥadÄ«th.[4] At this time, the ShÄ«'a distinguished themselves from the Sunni in the category of law, which employed such methods as qiyas "analogical reasoning" and exegesis". However, the ShÄ«'a developed law directly from the traditions of the ImÄms.[4] Initially during the Buyid period, the Twelver ulamÄ' considered that since the ImÄm had gone into Occultation and his NÄ'ib al-Khass was no longer present, all the functions invested in the ImÄm had lapsed. The principal functions of the ImÄm had been:
However, it soon became apparent that the situation caused by lapse of functions of the Hidden ImÄm was extremely impractical and left the Twelver ShÄ«'a community at a great disadvantage, with no leadership, no organization and no financial structure.[5] [] History[] The first transgressionAs early as the 5th century A.H. / 11th century CE, more than 150 years after the Occultation of the 12th ImÄm, Shaykhu t-Ta'ifa reinterpreted the doctrine to allow delegation of the ImÄm's judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh. Although he implies in his writings that this function should only be undertaken by the ulama if there is no one else to do it. Shaykhu t-Taifa considered the ulamÄ' the best agents of the donor to distribute religious taxes since they knew to whom it should be distributed. Nevertheless, individuals were free to do this themselves if they wished. He allowed fuqahÄ' to organize Friday prayers in absence of the ImÄm or his special representative. The prominent ShÄ«'a scholars who rejected this thesis were:
It is to be noted that `Alam al-Huda was from among the Shaykhu t-Taifa's group. [] The second transgressionBy the 13th century, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli was able to advance these concepts very considerably. He extended the judicial role of the ulama to iqamat al-hudud the imposition of penalties by ulama themselves. In his writings it is possible to see the evolution in his thinking whereby the fuqahÄ' develop from the deputies of the donor for the distribution of religious taxes in his early writings to being the deputies of the Hidden ImÄm for collection and distribution of the taxes in his later works.[6] In effect, transgressing the limits set by Shaykhu t-Taifa (two centuries earlier) in his first transgression. [] The third transgressionMuhaqqiq al-Karkhi (About 300 years after the second transgression) was the first to suggest, arguing from the hadith of 'Umar ibn Hanzala, that the ulama were the NÄ'ib al-'Amm (general representative) of the Hidden ImÄm. But he restricted his application of this argument to the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers.[6] [] The fourth transgressionIt was ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« who took the concept of NÄ'ib al-'Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious sphere and applied it to all of the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden ImÄm. Thus the judicial authority of the ulamÄ' now became a direct reflection of the authority of the ImÄm himself. It was now obligatory to pay the religious taxes directly to the ulamÄ' as the trustees of the ImÄm for distribution and the donor who distributed these himself was considered to obtain no reward. This is in direct contradiction to limits set by prior transgressions. Furthermore, ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« extended the range of those eligible to receive money from zakÄt to include religious students and the ulamÄ' themselves, who thus became the recipients of the money as trustees of students. Even in the field of defensive jihÄd, ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« identified a role for the ulamÄ'. Only in the field of offensive jihÄd did he allow that the role of Hidden ImÄm had lapsed pending his return.[6] Although the aforementioned scholars were not mujtahids in their full capacity, they introduced innovative concepts into ShÄ«'a theology which later formed the basis of the exegetical school. Their innovations were sharply criticized by prominent ShÄ«'a scholars of their time and thus, remained mostly theoretical. The ulama of this period were overshadowed by the towering figure of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1616-1698),[3] whose rejection of the emerging doctrine of exegesis overwhelmed the attempts of the group of ulamÄ' with Usuli tendencies (who were then in minority). However, after the death of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, the influence of Usuli way of thinking was increasing due to its promising nature towards the unconditional supremacy of ulamÄ' and the deal of freedom of practice it had to offer. The traditional ShÄ«'a doctrine was, by its nature, fatal to leadership of any regime except that of ImÄm al-Mahdi since they believed that an Islamic state can be established only under the leadership of an infallible ImÄm. Thus, the ShÄ«'a had little role to play in supporting the decisions of the state, in contrast with the Sunni tendency of offering their full support to the Ottoman Empire. This caused a great deal of paranoia to the states where the ShÄ«'a were in majority. By the end of Safavid era the situation had become intense due to the rise of imperialism on a global scale. It was necessary to develop an alternate ideology for the survival of Iranian state. This is when a group of ulamÄ' were encouraged to squeeze out the possibility of extending the state's control over the shia majority; by whatever means necessary. The revival of AkhbÄrism, or "neo-AkhbÄrism" as it became known, was under the dean of Karbala scholarship, Yusuf Al Bahrani (1695-1772), who led an intellectual assault on Usuli thought in the mid-eighteenth century. An AkhbÄrÄ« critique of Usulism had emerged in Bahrain at the beginning of the eighteenth century, partly spurred by the weaknesses of the Usuli sponsoring Safavid empire[7]. By succeeding to the role of dean of Karbala as one of the pre-eminent scholars of the age, al-Bahrani's extended this Bahrain-based debate to the rest of the ShÄ«'a world.
[] BihbahaniUnder al-Bahrani, Usuli scholarship was considered impure and it was not until the 1760s that an Usuli cell was founded in Karbala. It was founded by Muhammad Baqir ibn Muhammad Akmal al-Wahid Bihbahani who challenged and eventually succeeded al-Bahraini as the most influential cleric in Karbala in 1772[9]. He led a campaign for propagation of Usuli tendencies and worked extensively to crystallize Usulism into a full fledged school to offer an alternative state-friendly version of ShÄ«'a fiqh and earned the titles Mu'assis "founder of the Usuli school", Murawwij "propagator" and Mujaddid. The Qajar rulers perceived this innovation as the only hope for gaining full control over the ShÄ«'a majority in the country and offered their full support to al-Wahid Bihbahani's group.[citation needed] Bihbahani surrounded himself with a corps of mirghadabs, servants who would carry out either corporal or capital punishment, and had his judgments carried out immediately and usually in his presence, in effect gathering for his school a paramilitary force.[10] However, Bihbahani's theology was not welcomed by the ulamÄ' who stood fast with older ShÄ«'a doctrines; this group came to be known as the AkhbÄrÄ«. Although this controversy had begun as a minor disagreement on a few points, it eventually grew into a bitter, vituperative dispute culminating in Bihbahani's declaration that the AkhbÄrÄ«s were infidels(Kuffar).[3] Subsequently, ulamÄ' who did not accept Bihbahani's authority were executed for their infidelity. At first the AkhbÄrÄ« predominated at the shrine cities of Iraq but it was Bihbahani who, at the end of 18th century, reversed this and completely routed the AkhbÄrÄ«s at Karbala and Najaf. South Iraq, Bahrain and a few cities in Iran such as Kirman remained AkhbÄrÄ« strongholds for a few more decades but eventually the Usuli triumph was complete and only a handful of ShÄ«'a ulamÄ' remained AkhbÄrÄ« to the present day.[3] After the theological coup brought about by al-Wahid Bihbahani by military methods, the Usuli school became instrumental to the Iranian regime. [] The fifth transgressionDuring the first Russo-Persian War (1804-1813), Fath Ali Shah's son and heir, Abbas Mirza, who was conducting the campaign, turned to the new ulama and obtained from Shaykh Ja'far Kashiful Ghita and other eminent clerics in Najaf and Isfahan a declaration of jihad against the Russians, thus implicitly recognizing their authority to issue such a declaration - one of the functions of the Hidden ImÄm. Kashifu l-Ghita used the opportunity to extract from the state acknowledgment of the ulama's right to collect the religious taxes of Khums. ."[11] This followed the pattern of other transgressions by overthrowing the limits of its prior (fourth) transgression. [] Iranian RevolutionFollowing the Iranian Revolution, the UsÅ«lÄ« school has gained popularity among previously AkhbÄrÄ« communities.[1] [] Rejection of the MujtahidsAkhbÄrÄ«s reject and even curse mujtahids. They practice this based on the last letter ImÄm Mahdi wrote to 'AlÄ« ibn Muhammad, fourth deputy of the Lesser Occultation. In the letter, ImÄm Zaman said:
AkhbÄrÄ«s claim that the ImÄms are the Äyatu l-LÄhs based on the Hadith-e Tariq. They say that no one else can ascribe themselves to this divine title. When you look at history, it wasn't until the early 1800s that the mujtahids started to call themselves Äyatu l-LÄhs. The Hadith-e Tariq says,
[] The arguments[] Pro-AkhbÄrÄ« arguments
[] Anti-AkhbÄrÄ« argumentsAkhbÄrÄ«s claim to follow Hadith directly, without the need for generalisation, or of finding the reason for the decision. This, according to Usulis, is a logical impossibility. Hadith takes the form of case law, that is to say the narration of decisions taken in a concrete situation. To "follow" such a decision one must know which features of the situation are or are not relevant to the decision, as the exact same set of facts will never occur twice. Therefore some degree of generalisation is unavoidable, even on the most literal view: the choice is simply between mechanical generalisation and intelligent generalisation. An example often cited in argument by Usulis concerns the practice of Ja'far al-Sadiq, who buried his son Isma'il ibn Jafar in a winding-sheet containing the inscription "Ismail testifies that there is no God but God". Ever since, AkhbÄrÄ«s have traditionally buried their dead with that inscription with the name "Ismail" regardless of the name of the deceased. Usulis point out that Ismail was actually the name of the son who was buried: their winding sheets therefore substitute the proper name of the deceased.[13] Regarding Islamic laws, there are various issues faced by Muslims in their daily lives. e.g. doubts in namÄz and their corrections, conditions which invalidate a fast and the relevant compensations, rulings vis í vis correctness or incorrectness of various social and business practices e.g. Investing in Mutual Funds, Use of alcohol based perfumes and medicines, etc. AkhbÄrÄ«s have no basis on which to interpret hadith on these issues since a lot of them would not have been mentioned in any hadith. And secondly, it would require deep knowledge of the life histories of narrators of these hadith to separate strong hadiths from weak hadiths. [] Prominent AkhbÄrÄ« scholars[] References
The AkhbÄrÄ«s (Arabic: اخباري) "Traditionalists" are Twelver ShÄ«'a Muslims who reject the use of ijtihad or reasoning in the creation of new laws, and believe only the Qur'an and aḥadÄ«th (prophetic sayings and recorded opinions of the ImÄms) should be used as sources of law.[1] They form a minority within ShÄ«'a Islam, with UsÅ«lÄ«s making up the majority. Unlike UsÅ«lÄ«s, AkhbÄrÄ«s do not follow marja's who practice ijtihad. The AkhbÄrÄ« movement was dominant in Twelver Shi'i Islam from the middle of the Safavid dynasty to the time of Muhammad Baqir Behbahani (d.1792) who along with other Usuli mujtahids crushed the Akhbari movement.[2] Today it is found primarily in the island nation of Bahrain,[1] with reportedly "only a handful of Shi'i ulema" remaining Akhbari "to the present day."[3]
[] BackgroundIn addition to fatÄwa based on ijtihad, AkhbÄrÄ«s also reject the permissibility of writing exegesis of the Qur'an without quoting the narrations of the infallible Ahlu l-Bayt. They quote the Hadith ath-Thaqalayn and several authentic traditions of the Twelve ImÄms to prohibit the practice of exegesis. In short, the gist of AkhbÄrÄ« ideology is that nothing but the aḥadÄ«th of the Infallibles can serve as authoritative evidence in Islam. AkhbÄrÄ«s also differ from UsÅ«lÄ«s in their rejection of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, arguing that preachers of religion have no role in politics, as is evidenced by the lives of the ImÄms and their followers. UsÅ«lism evolved on the basis of hypothetical concepts and perceptions of some scholars, centuries after the major occultation. Among the earliest ShÄ«'a ulamÄ' such as Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni and Ibn Babawaiyya, the most important activity was transmission of aḥadÄ«th.[4] At this time, the ShÄ«'a distinguished themselves from the Sunni in the category of law, which employed such methods as qiyas "analogical reasoning" and exegesis". However, the ShÄ«'a developed law directly from the traditions of the ImÄms.[4] Initially during the Buyid period, the Twelver ulamÄ' considered that since the ImÄm had gone into Occultation and his NÄ'ib al-Khass was no longer present, all the functions invested in the ImÄm had lapsed. The principal functions of the ImÄm had been:
However, it soon became apparent that the situation caused by lapse of functions of the Hidden ImÄm was extremely impractical and left the Twelver ShÄ«'a community at a great disadvantage, with no leadership, no organization and no financial structure.[5] [] History[] The first transgressionAs early as the 5th century A.H. / 11th century CE, more than 150 years after the Occultation of the 12th ImÄm, Shaykhu t-Ta'ifa reinterpreted the doctrine to allow delegation of the ImÄm's judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh. Although he implies in his writings that this function should only be undertaken by the ulama if there is no one else to do it. Shaykhu t-Taifa considered the ulamÄ' the best agents of the donor to distribute religious taxes since they knew to whom it should be distributed. Nevertheless, individuals were free to do this themselves if they wished. He allowed fuqahÄ' to organize Friday prayers in absence of the ImÄm or his special representative. The prominent ShÄ«'a scholars who rejected this thesis were:
It is to be noted that `Alam al-Huda was from among the Shaykhu t-Taifa's group. [] The second transgressionBy the 13th century, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli was able to advance these concepts very considerably. He extended the judicial role of the ulama to iqamat al-hudud the imposition of penalties by ulama themselves. In his writings it is possible to see the evolution in his thinking whereby the fuqahÄ' develop from the deputies of the donor for the distribution of religious taxes in his early writings to being the deputies of the Hidden ImÄm for collection and distribution of the taxes in his later works.[6] In effect, transgressing the limits set by Shaykhu t-Taifa (two centuries earlier) in his first transgression. [] The third transgressionMuhaqqiq al-Karkhi (About 300 years after the second transgression) was the first to suggest, arguing from the hadith of 'Umar ibn Hanzala, that the ulama were the NÄ'ib al-'Amm (general representative) of the Hidden ImÄm. But he restricted his application of this argument to the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers.[6] [] The fourth transgressionIt was ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« who took the concept of NÄ'ib al-'Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious sphere and applied it to all of the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden ImÄm. Thus the judicial authority of the ulamÄ' now became a direct reflection of the authority of the ImÄm himself. It was now obligatory to pay the religious taxes directly to the ulamÄ' as the trustees of the ImÄm for distribution and the donor who distributed these himself was considered to obtain no reward. This is in direct contradiction to limits set by prior transgressions. Furthermore, ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« extended the range of those eligible to receive money from zakÄt to include religious students and the ulamÄ' themselves, who thus became the recipients of the money as trustees of students. Even in the field of defensive jihÄd, ShahÄ«d ath-ThÄnÄ« identified a role for the ulamÄ'. Only in the field of offensive jihÄd did he allow that the role of Hidden ImÄm had lapsed pending his return.[6] Although the aforementioned scholars were not mujtahids in their full capacity, they introduced innovative concepts into ShÄ«'a theology which later formed the basis of the exegetical school. Their innovations were sharply criticized by prominent ShÄ«'a scholars of their time and thus, remained mostly theoretical. The ulama of this period were overshadowed by the towering figure of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1616-1698),[3] whose rejection of the emerging doctrine of exegesis overwhelmed the attempts of the group of ulamÄ' with Usuli tendencies (who were then in minority). However, after the death of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, the influence of Usuli way of thinking was increasing due to its promising nature towards the unconditional supremacy of ulamÄ' and the deal of freedom of practice it had to offer. The traditional ShÄ«'a doctrine was, by its nature, fatal to leadership of any regime except that of ImÄm al-Mahdi since they believed that an Islamic state can be established only under the leadership of an infallible ImÄm. Thus, the ShÄ«'a had little role to play in supporting the decisions of the state, in contrast with the Sunni tendency of offering their full support to the Ottoman Empire. This caused a great deal of paranoia to the states where the ShÄ«'a were in majority. By the end of Safavid era the situation had become intense due to the rise of imperialism on a global scale. It was necessary to develop an alternate ideology for the survival of Iranian state. This is when a group of ulamÄ' were encouraged to squeeze out the possibility of extending the state's control over the shia majority; by whatever means necessary. The revival of AkhbÄrism, or "neo-AkhbÄrism" as it became known, was under the dean of Karbala scholarship, Yusuf Al Bahrani (1695-1772), who led an intellectual assault on Usuli thought in the mid-eighteenth century. An AkhbÄrÄ« critique of Usulism had emerged in Bahrain at the beginning of the eighteenth century, partly spurred by the weaknesses of the Usuli sponsoring Safavid empire[7]. By succeeding to the role of dean of Karbala as one of the pre-eminent scholars of the age, al-Bahrani's extended this Bahrain-based debate to the rest of the ShÄ«'a world.
[] BihbahaniUnder al-Bahrani, Usuli scholarship was considered impure and it was not until the 1760s that an Usuli cell was founded in Karbala. It was founded by Muhammad Baqir ibn Muhammad Akmal al-Wahid Bihbahani who challenged and eventually succeeded al-Bahraini as the most influential cleric in Karbala in 1772[9]. He led a campaign for propagation of Usuli tendencies and worked extensively to crystallize Usulism into a full fledged school to offer an alternative state-friendly version of ShÄ«'a fiqh and earned the titles Mu'assis "founder of the Usuli school", Murawwij "propagator" and Mujaddid. The Qajar rulers perceived this innovation as the only hope for gaining full control over the ShÄ«'a majority in the country and offered their full support to al-Wahid Bihbahani's group.[citation needed] Bihbahani surrounded himself with a corps of mirghadabs, servants who would carry out either corporal or capital punishment, and had his judgments carried out immediately and usually in his presence, in effect gathering for his school a paramilitary force.[10] However, Bihbahani's theology was not welcomed by the ulamÄ' who stood fast with older ShÄ«'a doctrines; this group came to be known as the AkhbÄrÄ«. Although this controversy had begun as a minor disagreement on a few points, it eventually grew into a bitter, vituperative dispute culminating in Bihbahani's declaration that the AkhbÄrÄ«s were infidels(Kuffar).[3] Subsequently, ulamÄ' who did not accept Bihbahani's authority were executed for their infidelity. At first the AkhbÄrÄ« predominated at the shrine cities of Iraq but it was Bihbahani who, at the end of 18th century, reversed this and completely routed the AkhbÄrÄ«s at Karbala and Najaf. South Iraq, Bahrain and a few cities in Iran such as Kirman remained AkhbÄrÄ« strongholds for a few more decades but eventually the Usuli triumph was complete and only a handful of ShÄ«'a ulamÄ' remained AkhbÄrÄ« to the present day.[3] After the theological coup brought about by al-Wahid Bihbahani by military methods, the Usuli school became instrumental to the Iranian regime. [] The fifth transgressionDuring the first Russo-Persian War (1804-1813), Fath Ali Shah's son and heir, Abbas Mirza, who was conducting the campaign, turned to the new ulama and obtained from Shaykh Ja'far Kashiful Ghita and other eminent clerics in Najaf and Isfahan a declaration of jihad against the Russians, thus implicitly recognizing their authority to issue such a declaration - one of the functions of the Hidden ImÄm. Kashifu l-Ghita used the opportunity to extract from the state acknowledgment of the ulama's right to collect the religious taxes of Khums. ."[11] This followed the pattern of other transgressions by overthrowing the limits of its prior (fourth) transgression. [] Iranian RevolutionFollowing the Iranian Revolution, the UsÅ«lÄ« school has gained popularity among previously AkhbÄrÄ« communities.[1] [] Rejection of the MujtahidsAkhbÄrÄ«s reject and even curse mujtahids. They practice this based on the last letter ImÄm Mahdi wrote to 'AlÄ« ibn Muhammad, fourth deputy of the Lesser Occultation. In the letter, ImÄm Zaman said:
AkhbÄrÄ«s claim that the ImÄms are the Äyatu l-LÄhs based on the Hadith-e Tariq. They say that no one else can ascribe themselves to this divine title. When you look at history, it wasn't until the early 1800s that the mujtahids started to call themselves Äyatu l-LÄhs. The Hadith-e Tariq says,
[] The arguments[] Pro-AkhbÄrÄ« arguments
[] Anti-AkhbÄrÄ« argumentsAkhbÄrÄ«s claim to follow Hadith directly, without the need for generalisation, or of finding the reason for the decision. This, according to Usulis, is a logical impossibility. Hadith takes the form of case law, that is to say the narration of decisions taken in a concrete situation. To "follow" such a decision one must know which features of the situation are or are not relevant to the decision, as the exact same set of facts will never occur twice. Therefore some degree of generalisation is unavoidable, even on the most literal view: the choice is simply between mechanical generalisation and intelligent generalisation. An example often cited in argument by Usulis concerns the practice of Ja'far al-Sadiq, who buried his son Isma'il ibn Jafar in a winding-sheet containing the inscription "Ismail testifies that there is no God but God". Ever since, AkhbÄrÄ«s have traditionally buried their dead with that inscription with the name "Ismail" regardless of the name of the deceased. Usulis point out that Ismail was actually the name of the son who was buried: their winding sheets therefore substitute the proper name of the deceased.[13] Regarding Islamic laws, there are various issues faced by Muslims in their daily lives. e.g. doubts in namÄz and their corrections, conditions which invalidate a fast and the relevant compensations, rulings vis í vis correctness or incorrectness of various social and business practices e.g. Investing in Mutual Funds, Use of alcohol based perfumes and medicines, etc. AkhbÄrÄ«s have no basis on which to interpret hadith on these issues since a lot of them would not have been mentioned in any hadith. And secondly, it would require deep knowledge of the life histories of narrators of these hadith to separate strong hadiths from weak hadiths. [] Prominent AkhbÄrÄ« scholars[] References
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